University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 28
Number 2 Summer 1998

Article 8

1998

Recent Developments: Harford County v. Town of
Bel Air: County Has No Governmental Immunity
in Contract Actions, Regardless of Whether
Contract Involves Proprietary or Governmental
Function
Theo Ogune

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Ogune, Theo (1998) "Recent Developments: Harford County v. Town of Bel Air: County Has No Governmental Immunity in
Contract Actions, Regardless of Whether Contract Involves Proprietary or Governmental Function," University of Baltimore Law
Forum: Vol. 28 : No. 2 , Article 8.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol28/iss2/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please
contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

Recent Developments

Harford County v. Town of Bel Air:

T

he Court of Appeals of
Maryland has held that a
county
does
not
enjoy
governmental
immunity
in
actions for breach of contract,
regardless of whether or not the
contract involves a governmental
function.
Harford County v.
Town of Bel Air, 348 Md. 363,
704 A.2d 421 (1998). In a
unanimous decision, the court
ruled that a county may not
abrogate its obligations under a
valid contract even by reason of
performing
governmental
functions for public good. The
court also held that, under the
doctrines of legal impossibility
and frustration of purpose,
changes in state regulations do
not, by themselves, relieve the
county of its contractual liabilities.
In so holding, the court
reaffirmed the rule that counties
and municipalities are to be
treated differently from State
agencies, for the purpose of
immunity in contract actions.
In 1954, Harford County and
the Town of Bel Air executed a
lease agreement upon which Bel
Air leased acreage from the
county. Bel Air used a portion of
this land as a landfill. In 1969,
the parties entered into a new
agreement, which replaced the
1954 contract. Pursuant to the
1969 contract, Bel Air agreed to
relinquish its claim to the twentyfive acres to which it was entitled
under the 1954 contract. In
exchange, the county agreed to
provide adequate facilities for the
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disposal of all refuse that
originated from Bel Air, at no "onsite expense" to Bel Air. This
agreement was to last for a term
of ninety-nine years.
In 1992, however, the
county enacted an ordinance
that imposed a thirty-five dollar
per ton "tipping" fee on solid
waste deposited in the county's
facilities.
The ordinance,
according to the county, was
necessary to accomplish the
objective of the Maryland
Recycling Act of 1988, which
required the county to recycle
twenty percent of its solid waste.
Following the 1992 ordinance,
the county attempted to charge
Bel Air for the waste being
deposited in the county's
facilities.
Bel Air sought a declaratory
judgment in the Circuit Court for
Harford County, contending,
among other things, that the fee
in question violated the 1969

agreement. The circuit court
agreed, and ruled that the 1969
contract exempted Bel Air from
payment of the fees. The county
appealed that ruling. Before a
hearing in the court of special
appeals, both the county and Bel
Air petitioned for a writ of
certiorari, which the court of
appeals granted.
The court of appeals focused
primarily on the county's
argument that Maryland law
entitled it to governmental
immunity in contract suits.
Harford County v. Town of Bel
Air, 348 Md. 363, 371, 704 A.2d
421, 424 (1998). The county,
relying on a line of cases dating
back to 1866, argued that it had
the right to repudiate any
contractual obligations incurred
in the performance of a
governmental function if such
repudiation would serve public
good. Id. According to the
county, since the disposal of
waste involved a governmental,
not a proprietary, function, it was
immune
from
any
such
contractual liabilities. Id.
The court of appeals rejected
the argument by first noting that
counties and municipalities in
Maryland have never been
accorded immunity in contract
cases. Harford, 348 Md. at 372,
704 A.2d at 425. (citing Board v.
Town of Riverdale, 320 Md. 384,
389,578 A.2d 207,210 (1990».
Generally,
governmental
immunity in contract cases has
only been extended to the State
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and its agencies. Id. Although
counties are State creations,
they have always been treated
differently from State agencies,
and have enjoyed immunity only
with respect to certain tort
actions. Id. Thus, the court
concluded, the question of
whether the actions under
scrutiny involved a governmental
or proprietary function arises
only in tort situations. Id. at 373,
704 A.2d 425.
As to the cases relied on by
the county, the court rejected the
county's interpretation of them.
Id. The court looked particularly
to the previous explanation of
Lake Roland Elevated Ry. Co.
and Rittenhouse by American
Structures v. City of Baltimore,
278 Md. 356, 364 A.2d 55
(1976). Id. at 374, 704 A.2d at
426. According to the court,
these cases specifically stand for
th e
proposition
that
"municipalities and counties [are]
subject to suit in contract actions,
whether the contracts were
made in the performance of a
governmental or proprietary
function ..." Id. at 387, 704
A.2d at 426. (quoting American
Structures, 278 Md. 356, 359-60,
364 A.2d 55 (1976». Moreover,
Lake Roland and Rittenhouse
concerned the constitutional
challenge
of certain
city
ordinances
that
repealed
previously granted contractual
rights. Id. at 380, 704 A.2d at
In holding that the
429.
ordinances were valid under the
Contract Clause, the courts did
not create local governmental
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immunity in contract suits. Id.
The court of appeals then
considered whether the county's
performance of its obligations
under the 1969 contract was
frustrated or made legally
impossible by the" enactment of
the Maryland Recycling Act of
1988. Id. at 384,704 A.2d 431.
The court observed that, under
the doctrine of frustration of
purpose, the determination of
whether the 1988 Act thwarted
the
county's
contractual
performance depended on three
(1)
whether the
factors:
enactment of the Act was
reasonably foreseeable; (2)
whether the Act was enacted by
a sovereign power; and (3)
whether the parties were
instrumental to the passage of
the Act. Id. (citing Montauk
Corp. v. Seeds, 215 Md. 491,
499, 138 A.2d 907, 911 (1.958».
The court noted that the
contract could only be found
legally impossible or frustrated if
performance under it was made
objectively impossible by the
1988 Act. Id. at 386, 704 A.2d at
432. (citing Levine v. Rendler,
272 Md. 1, 7-12, 320 A.2d 258,
262-5 (1974». The court found
that none of the above doctrines
worked to relieve the county of
its obligations to Bel Air. Id. at
387, 704 A.2d at 432-33. It
rejected the argument that the
1988 Act's requirement of
"recycling" frustrated the parties'
contemplation of "disposal" in the
1969 agreement. Id. The court
looked to the statutory definition
of "solid waste acceptance

facility". Id. "Facility," according
to the court, is broadly defined to
include "any other type plant the
primary purpose of which is for
the disposal, treatment or
processing of solid waste." Id.
(quoting Md. Ann. Code art. 43,
section 387C(a)(16) (1980 Rep.
Vol.». Since, from this definition,
"disposal" includes "recycling,"
the contractual contemplation of
the parties was neither frustrated
nor made legally impossible. Id.
Moreover, the 1988 Act was
reasonably foreseeable. Id. The
Act, although expensive to the
county, did not prevent the
exemption of Bel Air from the
thirty-five dollar fee. Id. at 388,
704 A.2d at 433.
The deCision of the court of
appeals in Harford County v.
Town of Bel Air that a county is
not entitled to governmental
immunity in contract suits is
consistent with Maryland public
policy. The modern trend has
been to curtail counties' freedom
to escape liabilities via the quick
enactment of local legislation.
Because of the distinctive nature
of local legislative process, the
extension
of governmental
immunity in contract cases could
lead to the violation of the
Commerce Clause of the U.S.
Constitution.
The court of
appeals has further ensured that
a county cannot by an ordinance
excuse itself of long-time
obligations
just
because
changes in times have made old
bargains unprofitable or more
costly.

